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A first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSBA) is a common type of auction. It is also known as blind auction. [1] In this type of auction, all bidders simultaneously submit sealed bids so that no bidder knows the bid of any other participant. The highest bidder pays the price that was submitted. [2]: p2 [3]
Dutch auctions are all sellers' bidding auctions, also known as silent auctions, which can be divided into two types. Manual silent auction is an early traditional form of price reduction auction, in which the auctioneer first publicly quotes the highest price, and then the bidders respond accordingly. In the event of a price that no one bids ...
Online auctions often use an equivalent version of Vickrey's second-price auction wherein bidders provide proxy bids for items. A proxy bid is an amount an individual values some item at. The online auction house will bid up the price of the item until the proxy bid for the winner is at the top.
In Dutch and Japanese auctions, the bids are confirmations. In a version of the Brazilian auction, bids are numbers of units being traded. Structure elements of a bid are called attributes. If a bid is one number like price, it is a single-attribute auction. If bids consists of multiple-attributes, it is a multi-attribute auction. [69] [70]
A Vickrey auction or sealed-bid second-price auction (SBSPA) is a type of sealed-bid auction. Bidders submit written bids without knowing the bid of the other people in the auction. The highest bidder wins but the price paid is the second-highest bid. This type of auction is strategically similar to an English auction and gives bidders an ...
In a sealed-bid second-price auction, there is a SBNE with =, i.e., each bidder bids exactly his/her signal. PROOF: The proof takes the point-of-view of Xenia. We assume that she knows that Yakov bids r Y {\displaystyle rY} , but she does not know Y {\displaystyle Y} .
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Suppose that a buyer has value v and bids b. His opponent bids according to the equilibrium bidding strategy. The support of the opponent's bid distribution is [0,B(1)]. Thus any bid of at least B(1) wins with probability 1. Therefore, the best bid b lies in the interval [0,B(1)] and so we can write this bid as b = B(x) where x lies in [0,1].