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However, under Federal Rule of Evidence 801 and the minority of U.S. jurisdictions that have adopted this rule, a prior inconsistent statement may be introduced as evidence of the truth of the statement itself if the prior statement was given in live testimony and under oath as part of a formal hearing, proceeding, trial, or deposition. [2]
In a minority of jurisdictions that follow FRE 801, the prior inconsistent statement may be used not only to impeach but also as substantive evidence. A prior inconsistent statement is admissible as substantive evidence if the statement was given under penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposition;
Prior to this case, prior inconsistent statements made by a witness other than an accused could merely be used to impeach the witness's credibility, not for substantive purposes. Here, the Court held that if the statements could be found to be both necessary and reliable then the statements could be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule.
Prior Inconsistent Statement – Rule 801(d)(1)(A): Congress amended the proposed rule so that the "rule now requires that the prior inconsistent statement be given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition. The rule as adopted covers statements before a grand jury."
Prior inconsistent statements: Many states have departed from the approach of the federal rules with respect to inconsistent statements. Under current law in these jurisdictions, a prior inconsistent statement made by a witness (even when not made under oath at a judicial proceeding or deposition) is admissible as substantive evidence provided ...
The decision stands for the proposition that the recorded, adopted statement of a witness to a crime inconsistent with her testimony at trial is properly admitted for both purposes of impeachment and as substantive evidence: "for its truth." [2] In Commonwealth v.
Such statements are admissible if a defendant opens the door by presenting conflicting testimony at trial. Quoting Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), it said: [2]...[t]he shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.
The rule has been adopted in most common law countries, including South Africa, Australia and Fiji, and it remains one of the primary rules of consideration during cross-examination. In Australia the rule in Browne v Dunn overlaps with section 46 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) and Evidence Act 1995 (Cth).