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The paper further describes the effects of adverse selection in insurance as an example of the effect of information asymmetry on markets, [2] a sort of "generalized Gresham's law". [2] The spiralling effect of how adverse selection worsens the quality of goods in the market
Examples of this problem are adverse selection, [1] moral hazard, [2] and monopolies of knowledge. [3] A common way to visualise information asymmetry is with a scale, with one side being the seller and the other the buyer.
Information asymmetry within the market relates to the seller having more information about the quality of the car as opposed to the buyer, creating adverse selection. [1] Adverse selection is a phenomenon where sellers are not willing to sell high quality goods at the lower prices buyers are willing to pay, with the result that buyers get ...
In life insurance, adverse selection describes the occurrence of individuals with a high-risk profession, hobby or health condition applying for life insurance more often than low-risk individuals ...
Examples of this problem are adverse selection [28] and moral hazard. Most commonly, information asymmetries are studied in the context of principal–agent problems. George Akerlof, Michael Spence, and Joseph E. Stiglitz developed the idea and shared the 2001 Nobel Prize in Economics. [29]
In economics, a moral hazard is a situation where an economic actor has an incentive to increase its exposure to risk because it does not bear the full costs associated with that risk, should things go wrong. For example, when a corporation is insured, it may take on higher risk knowing that its insurance will pay the
Death spiral is a condition where the structure of insurance plans leads to premiums rapidly increasing as a result of changes in the covered population. It is the result of adverse selection in insurance policies in which lower risk policy holders choose to change policies or be uninsured.
In contract theory, the terms "screening models" and "adverse selection models" are often used interchangeably. [13] An agent has private information about his type (e.g., his costs or his valuation of a good) before the principal makes a contract offer. The principal will then offer a menu of contracts in order to separate the different types ...