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The term naturalistic fallacy is sometimes used to label the problematic inference of an ought from an is (the is–ought problem). [3] Michael Ridge relevantly elaborates that "[t]he intuitive idea is that evaluative conclusions require at least one evaluative premise—purely factual premises about the naturalistic features of things do not entail or even support evaluative conclusions."
Naturalistic fallacy (sometimes confused with appeal to nature) is the inverse of moralistic fallacy. Is–ought fallacy [107] – deduce a conclusion about what ought to be, on the basis of what is. Naturalistic fallacy fallacy [108] (anti-naturalistic fallacy) [109] – inferring an impossibility to infer any instance of ought from is from ...
A similar view is defended by G. E. Moore's open-question argument, intended to refute any identification of moral properties with natural properties, which is asserted by ethical naturalists, who do not deem the naturalistic fallacy a fallacy. The is–ought problem is closely related to the fact–value distinction in epistemology.
A naturalistic fallacy can occur, for example, in the case of sheer quantity metrics based on the premise "more is better" [43] or, in the case of developmental assessment in the field of psychology, "higher is better". [46] A false analogy occurs when claims are supported by unsound comparisons between data points.
G. I. Joe fallacy, the tendency to think that knowing about cognitive bias is enough to overcome it. [66] Gambler's fallacy, the tendency to think that future probabilities are altered by past events, when in reality they are unchanged. The fallacy arises from an erroneous conceptualization of the law of large numbers. For example, "I've ...
For example, an invalid inference "Because everybody ought to be equal, there are no innate genetic differences between people" is an instance of the moralistic fallacy. Where the naturalistic fallacy attempts to move from an "is" to an "ought" statement, the moralistic fallacy attempts to move from an "ought" to an "is" statement.
However, it could be seen as a variation of the very same naturalistic fallacy; the difference between them could be considered pragmatical, depending on the intentions of the person who uses it: naturalistic fallacy if the user wants to justify existing social practices with the argument that they are natural; moralistic fallacy if the user ...
As philosopher G. E. Moore famously argued, many early versions of normative evolutionary ethics seemed to commit a logical mistake that Moore dubbed the naturalistic fallacy. This was the mistake of defining a normative property, such as goodness, in terms of some non-normative, naturalistic property, such as pleasure or survival.