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He says this threatens the definition of contingent statements as non-necessary things when one generically intuits that some of what exists does so contingently, rather than necessarily. [9] Harry Deutsch acknowledged Prior's concern and outlines rudimentary notes about a "Logic for Contingent Beings."
Furthermore, that there must exist a necessary being, whose non-existence is impossible, to explain the origination of all contingent beings. Therefore, there exists a necessary being. It is possible that a necessary being has a cause of its necessity in another necessary being. The derivation of necessity between beings cannot regress to ...
That is, of beings no one of which can account for its own existence. You say that the series of events needs no explanation: I say that if there were no necessary being, no being which must exist and cannot not-exist, nothing would exist. The infinity of the series of contingent beings, even if proved, would be irrelevant.
He identified God as a necessary being that is the source of everything else, which only has contingent existence. [191] In 8th-century Indian philosophy, the school of Advaita Vedanta emerged. It says that only a single all-encompassing entity exists, stating that the impression of a plurality of distinct entities is an illusion. [192]
A posteriori necessity existing would make the distinction between a prioricity, analyticity, and necessity harder to discern because they were previously thought to be largely separated from the a posteriori, the synthetic, and the contingent. [3] (a) P is a priori iff P is necessary. (b) P is a posteriori iff P is contingent.
[11] The sufficient reason for a necessary truth is that its negation is a contradiction. [4] Leibniz admitted contingent truths, that is, facts in the world that are not necessarily true, but that are nonetheless true. Even these contingent truths, according to Leibniz, can only exist on the basis of sufficient reasons.
This means that even though a future contingent will occur, it may not have done so according to present contingent facts; as such, the truth value of a proposition concerning that future contingent is true, but true in a contingent way. al-Farabi uses the following example; if we argue truly that Zayd will take a trip tomorrow, then he will ...
There are many academic debates about the existence of merely possible objects. According to actualism, only actual entities have being; this includes both contingent and necessary entities but excludes merely possible entities. [48] Possibilists reject this view and state there are also merely possible objects besides actual objects. [49]