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USB Key Mode: The user must insert a USB device that contains a startup key into the computer to be able to boot the protected OS. Note that this mode requires that the BIOS on the protected machine supports the reading of USB devices in the pre-OS environment. BitLocker does not support smart cards for pre-boot authentication. [31]
Microsoft DaRT is based on the Windows Preinstallation Environment. The tool set includes: [8] [9] [10] Registry Editor: Edits Windows Registry; Locksmith: Resets a user account's password; Crash Analyzer: Analyzes crash dumps; File Restore: Restores deleted files; Disk Commander: Repairs volumes, master boot records and partitions
In the case of disk encryption applications that can be configured to allow the operating system to boot without a pre-boot PIN being entered or a hardware key being present (e.g. BitLocker in a simple configuration that uses a TPM without a two-factor authentication PIN or USB key), the time frame for the attack is not limiting at all. [2]
Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE) is a set of tools based on Windows PE to help diagnose and recover from serious errors which may be preventing Windows from booting successfully. Windows RE is installed alongside Windows Vista and later, and may be booted from hard disks, optical media (such as an operating system installation disc) and PXE ...
In all versions of Windows 9x except ME, it is also possible to load Windows by booting to a DOS prompt and typing "win". There are some command line switches that can be used with the WIN command: with the /D switch, Windows boots to safe mode , and with the /D:n switch, Windows boots to safe mode with networking.
However, because of the design of the Windows kernel, Kernel Patch Protection cannot completely prevent kernel patching. [ 2 ] [ 3 ] This has led to criticism that since KPP is an imperfect defense, the problems caused to antivirus vendors outweigh the benefits because authors of malicious software will simply find ways around its defenses.
In case of physical access, computers with TPM 1.2 are vulnerable to cold boot attacks as long as the system is on or can be booted without a passphrase from shutdown, sleep or hibernation, which is the default setup for Windows computers with BitLocker full disk encryption. [66]
Using a boot-time driver that can ask for a password from the user; Using a network interchange to recover the key, for instance as part of a PXE boot; Using a TPM to store the decryption key, preventing unauthorized access of the decryption key or subversion of the boot loader; Using a combination of the above