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Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), was a 6–3 decision by the United States Supreme Court which held for Fourth Amendment purposes, a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted.
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court that extended Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) to allow searches of car compartments during a stop with reasonable suspicion.
Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990), was a United States Supreme Court case involving the constitutionality of police sobriety checkpoints. The Court held 6-3 that these checkpoints met the Fourth Amendment standard of "reasonable search and seizure." However, upon remand to the Michigan Supreme Court, that court held ...
Challenging false statements made in support of issuing a search warrant Regents of the University of California v. Bakke: 438 U.S. 265 (1978) Racial discrimination, affirmative action Lockett v. Ohio: 438 U.S. 586 (1978) Mitigating evidence required by the Eighth Amendment in capital sentencing proceedings FCC v. Pacifica Foundation: 438 U.S ...
The warrants make clear that Michigan Attorney General Dana Nessel is still gathering new information in her probe, nine months after she charged the state’s fake electors with forgery and other ...
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), is a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court held that it does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution for a trained police dog to sniff a person's luggage or property in a public place.
Warrantless home invasions are intrusive and dangerous for those on the receiving end.
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that firefighters can not enter a burned premises (in this case, a furniture store) to retrieve evidence of arson barring a search warrant, evidence of exigent circumstances, evidence of abandonment, or consent.