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Benjamin "Ben" Polak (born 22 December 1961) is a British professor of economics and management and former Provost at Yale University. From 1999 to 2001 Polak was the Henry Kohn Associate Professor of Economics [4] [5] and is now the inaugural William C. Brainard Professor of Economics. [6] In January 2013, he became the Provost of Yale ...
In applied game theory, the definition of the strategy sets is an important part of the art of making a game simultaneously solvable and meaningful. The game theorist can use knowledge of the overall problem, that is the friction between two or more players, to limit the strategy spaces, and ease the solution.
In game theory, a solution concept is a formal rule for predicting how a game will be played. These predictions are called "solutions", and describe which strategies will be adopted by players and, therefore, the result of the game. The most commonly used solution concepts are equilibrium concepts, most famously Nash equilibrium.
Separately, game theory has played a role in online algorithms; in particular, the k-server problem, which has in the past been referred to as games with moving costs and request-answer games. [125] Yao's principle is a game-theoretic technique for proving lower bounds on the computational complexity of randomized algorithms , especially online ...
Findings from behavioral game theory will tend to have higher external validity and can be better applied to real world decision-making behavior. [14] Behavioral game theory is a primarily positive theory rather than a normative theory. [14] A positive theory seeks to describe phenomena rather than prescribe a correct action.
This equivalence, notably formalized in Kuhn's theorem, simplifies the analysis of such games. [4] It is a core component of how game theorists analyze extensive-form games. The formal definition of perfect recall involves the concept of information sets in extensive-form games. It ensures that if a player reaches a certain information set, the ...
Below, the normal form for both of these games is shown as well. The first game is simply sequential―when player 2 makes a choice, both parties are already aware of whether player 1 has chosen O(pera) or F(ootball). The second game is also sequential, but the dotted line shows player 2's information set. This is the common way to show that ...
Conditions on G (the stage game) – whether there are any technical conditions that should hold in the one-shot game in order for the theorem to work. Conditions on x (the target payoff vector of the repeated game) – whether the theorem works for any individually rational and feasible payoff vector, or only on a subset of these vectors.