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In semantics and pragmatics, a truth condition is the condition under which a sentence is true. For example, "It is snowing in Nebraska" is true precisely when it is snowing in Nebraska. Truth conditions of a sentence do not necessarily reflect current reality. They are merely the conditions under which the statement would be true. [1]
Truth-conditional semantics is an approach to semantics of natural language that sees meaning (or at least the meaning of assertions) as being the same as, or reducible to, their truth conditions. This approach to semantics is principally associated with Donald Davidson , and attempts to carry out for the semantics of natural language what ...
A contemporary semantic definition of truth would define truth for the atomic sentences as follows: An atomic sentence F ( x 1 ,..., x n ) is true (relative to an assignment of values to the variables x 1 , ..., x n )) if the corresponding values of variables bear the relation expressed by the predicate F .
Revelation may be defined as truth emanating from God. Many religions fundamentally rely on revelation as a test of truth. This criterion is subject to the same criticisms as intuition. It may be a valid reference of truth for an individual, but it is inadequate for providing a coherent proof of the knowledge to others. [14]
Tarski's material adequacy condition, or Convention T, is: a definition of truth for an object language implies all instances of the sentential form (T) S is true if and only if P. where S is replaced by a name of a sentence (in the object language) and P is replaced by a translation of that sentence in the metalanguage.
Theories of truth may be described according to several dimensions of description that affect the character of the predicate "true". The truth predicates that are used in different theories may be classified by the number of things that have to be mentioned in order to assess the truth of a sign, counting the sign itself as the first thing.
The criticism states that there is no real difference between "the truth in the world" (alethic) and "the truth in an individual's mind" (epistemic). [3] An investigation has not found a single language in which alethic and epistemic modalities would be formally distinguished, for example by the means of a grammatical mood . [ 4 ]
Or the conditions under which the consensus is conceived to be possible may be formulated as idealizations of actual conditions. A very common type of ideal consensus theory refers to a community that is an idealization of actual communities in one or more respects.