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Benjamin "Ben" Polak (born 22 December 1961) is a British professor of economics and management and former Provost at Yale University. From 1999 to 2001 Polak was the Henry Kohn Associate Professor of Economics [4] [5] and is now the inaugural William C. Brainard Professor of Economics. [6] In January 2013, he became the Provost of Yale ...
This equivalence, notably formalized in Kuhn's theorem, simplifies the analysis of such games. [4] It is a core component of how game theorists analyze extensive-form games. The formal definition of perfect recall involves the concept of information sets in extensive-form games. It ensures that if a player reaches a certain information set, the ...
Separately, game theory has played a role in online algorithms; in particular, the k-server problem, which has in the past been referred to as games with moving costs and request-answer games. [125] Yao's principle is a game-theoretic technique for proving lower bounds on the computational complexity of randomized algorithms , especially online ...
In applied game theory, the definition of the strategy sets is an important part of the art of making a game simultaneously solvable and meaningful. The game theorist can use knowledge of the overall problem, that is the friction between two or more players, to limit the strategy spaces, and ease the solution.
In game theory, an information set represents all possible points (or decision nodes) in a game that a given player might be at during their turn, based on their current knowledge and observations. These nodes are indistinguishable to the player due to incomplete information about previous actions or the state of the game .
Findings from behavioral game theory will tend to have higher external validity and can be better applied to real world decision-making behavior. [14] Behavioral game theory is a primarily positive theory rather than a normative theory. [14] A positive theory seeks to describe phenomena rather than prescribe a correct action.
A classic example of a dynamic game with types is a war game where the player is unsure whether their opponent is a risk-taking "hawk" type or a pacifistic "dove" type. Perfect Bayesian Equilibria are a refinement of Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE), which is a solution concept with Bayesian probability for non-turn-based games.
It should only contain pages that are Books about game theory or lists of Books about game theory, as well as subcategories containing those things (themselves set categories). Topics about Books about game theory in general should be placed in relevant topic categories .