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In constructive mathematics, the limited principle of omniscience (LPO) and the lesser limited principle of omniscience (LLPO) are axioms that are nonconstructive but are weaker than the full law of the excluded middle. They are used to gauge the amount of nonconstructivity required for an argument, as in constructive reverse mathematics.
It provides a challenge to the knowability thesis, which states that every truth is, in principle, knowable. The paradox states that this assumption implies the omniscience principle, which asserts that every truth is known. Essentially, Fitch's paradox asserts that the existence of an unknown truth is unknowable.
In logic, the law of excluded middle or the principle of excluded middle states that for every proposition, either this proposition or its negation is true. [1] [2] It is one of the three laws of thought, along with the law of noncontradiction, and the law of identity; however, no system of logic is built on just these laws, and none of these laws provides inference rules, such as modus ponens ...
For example, a particular statement may be shown to imply the law of the excluded middle. An example of a Brouwerian counterexample of this type is Diaconescu's theorem, which shows that the full axiom of choice is non-constructive in systems of constructive set theory, since the axiom of choice implies the law of excluded middle in such systems.
The Molinist position, exemplified by Craig in the preceding paragraph, is 1) to argue this requires potentially heretical arguments relating to a limitation of divine omniscience, and 2) that a choice can be free, and yet the way in which an agent will make that choice can be known apart from observation of the actualized choice itself (and ...
Since the principles of certain sciences, such as logic, geometry and arithmetic are taken only from the formal principles of things, on which the essence of the thing depends, it follows that God could not make things contrary to these principles. For example, that a genus was not predicable of the species, or that lines drawn from the centre ...
In addition to Plantinga's free-will defense, there are other arguments purporting to undermine or disprove the logical argument from evil. [13] Plantinga's free-will defense is the best known of these responses at least in part because of his thoroughness in describing and addressing the relevant questions and issues in God, Freedom, and Evil.
Epicurus was not an atheist, although he rejected the idea of a god concerned with human affairs; followers of Epicureanism denied the idea that there was no god. While the conception of a supreme, happy and blessed god was the most popular during his time, Epicurus rejected such a notion, as he considered it too heavy a burden for a god to have to worry about all the problems in the world.