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Tirpitz also argued that Germany had invested too much money into the naval program to halt it and that the domestic political coalition that had been created to support the naval buildup would react unpredictably if the government left the arms race. Facing an ever-expanding budget deficit, but lacking the confidence of the Kaiser and unable ...
This theory sparked a naval arms race between Germany and Great Britain in the first decade of the 20th century. This theory was based on the assumption that Great Britain would have to send its fleet into the German Bight for a close blockade of the ports (blockading Germany was the only way that the Royal Navy could seriously harm Germany ...
Padfield, Peter The Great Naval Race: Anglo-German Naval Rivalry 1900–1914 (2005) Palmer, Alan. Crowned Cousins: The Anglo-German Royal Connection (London, 1985). Ramsden, John. Don’t Mention the War: The British and the Germans since 1890 (London, 2006). Reinermann, Lothar. "Fleet Street and the Kaiser: British public opinion and Wilhelm II."
The phrase World War I naval arms race most often refers to the Anglo-German dreadnought race that is often cited as a factor in kindling the war. It can also refer to at least three other naval arms races that occurred around the same period: Anglo–German naval arms race; South American dreadnought race, pre-war
The Anglo-German Naval Agreement (AGNA) of 18 June 1935 was a naval agreement between the United Kingdom and Germany regulating the size of the Kriegsmarine in relation to the Royal Navy. The Anglo-German Naval Agreement fixed a ratio whereby the total tonnage of the Kriegsmarine was to be 35% of the total tonnage of the Royal Navy on a ...
The South American dreadnought race between Argentina, Brazil and Chile from 1907 to 1914. The Anglo-German naval arms race, between Imperial Germany and the United Kingdom from 1898 to 1912. The Cold War nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, which involved both land and naval nuclear expansion.
The plans were opposed throughout by Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, State Secretary of the German Imperial Naval Office. They were shelved in 1899 when it became apparent that the German navy and merchant marine were not sufficiently strong to accomplish an invasion without compromising the secrecy considered essential for success.
During the initial period of German naval expansion, Britain did not feel particularly threatened. [6] The Lords of the Admiralty felt the implications of the Second Naval Law were not a significantly more dangerous threat than the fleet set by the First Naval Law; they believed it was more important to focus on the practical situation rather than speculation on future programs that might ...