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Cooperative game theory is a branch of game theory that deals with the study of games where players can form coalitions, cooperate with one another, and make binding agreements. The theory offers mathematical methods for analysing scenarios in which two or more players are required to make choices that will affect other players wellbeing. [5]
In cooperative game theory, the Shapley value is a method (solution concept) for fairly distributing the total gains or costs among a group of players who have collaborated. For example, in a team project where each member contributed differently, the Shapley value provides a way to determine how much credit or blame each member deserves.
Constant sum: A game is a constant sum game if the sum of the payoffs to every player are the same for every single set of strategies. In these games, one player gains if and only if another player loses. A constant sum game can be converted into a zero sum game by subtracting a fixed value from all payoffs, leaving their relative order unchanged.
A hedonic game is specified by giving a finite set of players, and, for each player, a preference ranking over all coalitions (subsets) of players that the player belongs to. The outcome of a hedonic game consists of a partition of the players into disjoint coalitions, that is, each player is assigned a unique group. Such partitions are often ...
An important problem in the theory of cooperative dynamic games is the time-consistency of a given imputation function (in Russian literature it is termed dynamic stability of optimality principle). Let say that a number of players has made a cooperative agreement at the start of the game.
Consider a transferable utility cooperative game (,) where denotes the set of players and is the characteristic function.An imputation is dominated by another imputation if there exists a coalition , such that each player in weakly-prefers (for all ) and there exists that strictly-prefers (<), and can enforce by threatening to leave the grand coalition to form (()).
A general cooperative game among n players is characterized by 2 n values - one value for each possible coalition. The nucleolus of a general game can be computed by any algorithm for lexicographic max-min optimization. These algorithms usually require to solve linear programs with one constraint for each objective value, plus some additional ...
The game was introduced in 1957 by R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa in their classic book, Games and Decisions. [1] Some authors prefer to avoid assigning sexes to the players and instead use Players 1 and 2, and some refer to the game as Bach or Stravinsky, using two concerts as the two events. [2]