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Dworkin's theory is "interpretive": the law is whatever follows from a constructive interpretation of the institutional history of the legal system. Dworkin argues that moral principles that people hold dear are often wrong, even to the extent that certain crimes are acceptable if one's principles are skewed enough.
In philosophy of law, law as integrity is a theory of law put forward by Ronald Dworkin. In general, it can be described as interpreting the law according to a community . [ 1 ]
The Hart–Dworkin debate is a debate in legal philosophy between H. L. A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin. At the heart of the debate lies a Dworkinian critique of Hartian legal positivism, specifically, the theory presented in Hart's book The Concept of Law. While Hart insists that judges are within bounds to legislate on the basis of rules of law ...
Dworkin informs his readers that the concept of law is the theory of what forms the ground of law. The "concept of law" was used by H.L.A. Hart as the title for an approach to law strongly oriented to Anglo-American reading of positive law to which Dworkin would find insufficient for dealing with issues of jurisprudence encountered throughout ...
Taking Rights Seriously is a 1977 book about the philosophy of law by the philosopher Ronald Dworkin.In the book, Dworkin argues against the dominant philosophy of Anglo-American legal positivism as presented by H. L. A. Hart in The Concept of Law (1961) and utilitarianism by proposing that rights of the individual against the state exist outside of the written law and function as "trumps ...
This is the opposite of the main claim of natural law theory. In the English-speaking world, interpretivism is usually identified with Ronald Dworkin's thesis on the nature of law as discussed in his text titled Law's Empire, which is sometimes seen as a third way between natural law and legal positivism.
[153] [154] Catharine MacKinnon, Dworkin's longtime friend and collaborator, published a column in The New York Times, celebrating what she described as Dworkin's "incandescent literary and political career", suggested that Dworkin deserved a nomination for the Nobel Prize in Literature, and complained that "lies about her views on sexuality ...
First, Dworkin rejects the need to distinguish between "legal" rules and a more complete political philosophy, since the rule of law is basically the theory of law and adjudication that he believes is correct. Secondly, the rule of law is not simply the thin or formal rule of law; the latter forms part of Dworkin's theory of law and adjudication.