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A philosophical zombie (or "p-zombie") is a being in a thought experiment in the philosophy of mind that is physically identical to a normal human being but does not have conscious experience. [ 1 ] For example, if a philosophical zombie were poked with a sharp object, it would not feel any pain, but it would react exactly the way any conscious ...
Type-B Materialism, also known as Weak Reductionism or A Posteriori Physicalism, is the view that the hard problem stems from human psychology, and is therefore not indicative of a genuine ontological gap between consciousness and the physical world. [45] Like Type-A Materialists, Type-B Materialists are committed to physicalism.
In the philosophy of mind, Leibniz's gap is the problem that thoughts cannot be observed or perceived solely by examining brain properties, events, and processes. Here the word "gap" is a metaphor of a subquestion regarding the mind–body problem that allegedly must be answered in order to reach a more profound understanding of qualia, consciousness and emergence.
Solipsism (/ ˈ s ɒ l ɪ p s ɪ z əm / ⓘ SOLL-ip-siz-əm; from Latin solus 'alone' and ipse 'self') [1] is the philosophical idea that only one's mind is sure to exist. As an epistemological position, solipsism holds that knowledge of anything outside one's own mind is unsure; the external world and other minds cannot be known and might not exist outside the mind.
The essential difference between the easy problems and the hard problem is that the former are at least theoretically answerable via the dominant strategy in the philosophy of mind: physicalism. Chalmers argues for an "explanatory gap" from the objective to the subjective, and criticizes physicalist explanations of mental experience, making him ...
'The problem of demarcation' is an expression introduced by Karl Popper to refer to 'the problem of finding a criterion which would enable us to distinguish between the empirical sciences on the one hand, and mathematics and logic as well as "metaphysical" systems on the other'.
This is a philosophical zombie, as formulated in the philosophy of mind. This new animal would reproduce just as any other human and eventually there would be more of these zombies. Natural selection would favor the zombies, since their design is (we could suppose) a bit simpler. Eventually the humans would die out.
Psychophysical parallelism can be compared to epiphenomenalism due to the fact that they are both non-fundamentalist methods to link mind and body causality. Psychophysical parallelism is the ideology that the mind and the body hold no interaction between them, but that they are synchronized.