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In a uniformly-random instance of the stable marriage problem with n men and n women, the average number of stable matchings is asymptotically . [6] In a stable marriage instance chosen to maximize the number of different stable matchings, this number is an exponential function of n. [7]
A stable matching always exists, and the algorithmic problem solved by the Gale–Shapley algorithm is to find one. [3] The stable matching problem has also been called the stable marriage problem, using a metaphor of marriage between men and women, and many sources describe the Gale–Shapley algorithm in terms of marriage proposals. However ...
1. A matching is called weakly stable unless there is a couple each of whom strictly prefers the other to his/her partner in the matching. Robert W. Irving [1] extended the Gale–Shapley algorithm as shown below to provide such a weakly stable matching in time, where n is the size of the stable marriage problem. Ties in the men and women's ...
Stable matching, a matching in which no two elements prefer each other to their matched partners; Independent vertex set, a set of vertices (rather than edges) no two of which are adjacent to each other; Stable marriage problem (also known as stable matching problem)
The comparator circuit value problem (CCVP) is CC-complete. In the stable marriage problem, there is an equal number of men and women. Each person ranks all members of the opposite sex. A matching between men and women is stable if there are no unpaired man and woman who prefer each other over their current partners. A stable matching always ...
The secretary problem demonstrates a scenario involving optimal stopping theory [1] [2] that is studied extensively in the fields of applied probability, statistics, and decision theory. It is also known as the marriage problem, the sultan's dowry problem, the fussy suitor problem, the googol game, and the best choice problem.
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The matching is stable if there are no two elements which are not roommates and which both prefer each other to their roommate under the matching. This is distinct from the stable-marriage problem in that the stable-roommates problem allows matches between any two elements, not just between classes of "men" and "women". It is commonly stated as: