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The term naturalistic fallacy is sometimes used to label the problematic inference of an ought from an is (the is–ought problem). [3] Michael Ridge relevantly elaborates that "[t]he intuitive idea is that evaluative conclusions require at least one evaluative premise—purely factual premises about the naturalistic features of things do not entail or even support evaluative conclusions."
Naturalistic fallacy (sometimes confused with appeal to nature) is the inverse of moralistic fallacy. Is–ought fallacy [107] – deduce a conclusion about what ought to be, on the basis of what is. Naturalistic fallacy fallacy [108] (anti-naturalistic fallacy) [109] – inferring an impossibility to infer any instance of ought from is from ...
A similar view is defended by G. E. Moore's open-question argument, intended to refute any identification of moral properties with natural properties, which is asserted by ethical naturalists, who do not deem the naturalistic fallacy a fallacy. The is–ought problem is closely related to the fact–value distinction in epistemology.
His doctoral dissertation, which focused on Moore's work, was entitled "Recent Intuitionism in British Ethics." Frankena became well known in the profession with his first published paper, "The Naturalistic Fallacy", Mind, 1939. During World War II, Frankena taught American history at the University of Michigan.
A formal fallacy, deductive fallacy, logical fallacy or non sequitur (Latin for "it does not follow") is a flaw in the structure of a deductive argument that renders the argument invalid. The flaw can be expressed in the standard system of logic. [ 1 ]
The philosopher William Frankena first used the term definist fallacy in a paper published in the British analytic philosophy journal Mind in 1939. [3] In this article he generalized and critiqued G. E. Moore's conception of the naturalistic fallacy. Moore had argued that good cannot be defined by natural properties.
Moore questions a fundamental pillar of ethics, specifically what the definition of "good" is. He concludes that "good" is indefinable because any attempts to do so commit the naturalistic fallacy. Principia Ethica was influential, with Moore's arguments being considered ground-breaking advances in the field of moral philosophy.
The fact–value distinction is closely related to the naturalistic fallacy, a topic debated in ethical and moral philosophy. G. E. Moore believed it essential to all ethical thinking. [7] However, contemporary philosophers like Philippa Foot have called into question the validity of such assumptions.