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The PKCS #1 standard defines the mathematical definitions and properties that RSA public and private keys must have. The traditional key pair is based on a modulus, n , that is the product of two distinct large prime numbers , p and q , such that n = p q {\displaystyle n=pq} .
PKCS Standards Summary; Version Name Comments PKCS #1: 2.2: RSA Cryptography Standard [1]: See RFC 8017. Defines the mathematical properties and format of RSA public and private keys (ASN.1-encoded in clear-text), and the basic algorithms and encoding/padding schemes for performing RSA encryption, decryption, and producing and verifying signatures.
IFSSA (Integer Factorization Signature Scheme with Appendix): Includes two variants of RSA, Rabin-Williams, and ESIGN, with several message encoding methods. "RSA1 with EMSA3" is essentially PKCS#1 v1.5 RSA signature; "RSA1 with EMSA4 encoding" is essentially RSA-PSS; "RSA1 with EMSA2 encoding" is essentially ANSI X9.31 RSA signature.
As such, OAEP should be used in any new application, and PKCS#1 v1.5 padding should be replaced wherever possible. The PKCS#1 standard also incorporates processing schemes designed to provide additional security for RSA signatures, e.g. the Probabilistic Signature Scheme for RSA .
Adaptive-chosen-ciphertext attacks were perhaps considered to be a theoretical concern, but not to have been be manifested in practice, until 1998, when Daniel Bleichenbacher (then of Bell Laboratories) demonstrated a practical attack against systems using RSA encryption in concert with the PKCS#1 v1.5 encoding function, including a version of the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol used by ...
[1] RSA-PSS is an adaptation of their work and is standardized as part of PKCS#1 v2.1 . In general, RSA-PSS should be used as a replacement for RSA-PKCS#1 v1.5.
The earliest well-known attack that uses a padding oracle is Bleichenbacher's attack of 1998, which attacks RSA with PKCS #1 v1.5 padding. [1] The term "padding oracle" appeared in literature in 2002, [2] after Serge Vaudenay's attack on the CBC mode decryption used within symmetric block ciphers. [3]
Bleichenbacher is particularly notable for devising attacks against the RSA public-key cryptosystem, namely when used with the PKCS#1 v1 standard published by RSA Laboratories. These attacks were able to break both RSA encryption and signatures produced using the PKCS #1 standard.