Search results
Results From The WOW.Com Content Network
Jerry Alan Fodor (/ ˈ f oʊ d ər / FOH-dər; April 22, 1935 – November 29, 2017) was an American philosopher and the author of works in the fields of philosophy of mind and cognitive science. [1]
In contrast, Fodor defines methodological individualism as the view that mental states have a semantically evaluable character—that is, they are relational states. The relation that provides semantic meaning can be a relation with the external world or with one's culture and, so long as the relation produces some change in the causal power of ...
In the 1980s, however, Jerry Fodor revived the idea of the modularity of mind, although without the notion of precise physical localizability. Drawing from Noam Chomsky's idea of the language acquisition device and other work in linguistics as well as from the philosophy of mind and the implications of optical illusions, he became a major proponent of the idea with the 1983 publication of ...
Fodor, Jerry (2000). The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology. Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press. ISBN 9780262062121. OCLC 43109956. Fodor, Jerry (2010). LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780199548774. OCLC 470698989. Harnad, Stevan (1994 ...
It is used in theories of the modularity of mind and the closely related society of mind theory and was developed by Jerry Fodor. It became better known throughout cognitive psychology by means of his book, The Modularity of Mind (1983). The nine aspects he lists that make up a mental module are domain specificity, mandatory operation, limited ...
Fodor defends LOTH by arguing that a connectionist model is just some realization or implementation of the classical computational theory of mind and therein necessarily employs a symbol-manipulating LOT. Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn use the notion of cognitive architecture in their defense. Cognitive architecture is the set of basic functions of ...
An early supporter was Jerry Fodor, who argued that the mind functions partly, by innate, domain-specific mental modules. [3] In Modularity of Mind, Fodor proposed the Hypothesis of Modest Modularity, stating that input systems such as perception and language are modular, whereas central systems such as belief fixation and practical reasoning ...
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Redirect page