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This view is characterized, according to Fodor, by two distinct assertions. One of these regards the internal structure of mental states and asserts that such states are non-relational. The other concerns the semantic theory of mental content and asserts that there is an isomorphism between the causal roles of such contents and the inferential ...
In contrast, Fodor defines methodological individualism as the view that mental states have a semantically evaluable character—that is, they are relational states. The relation that provides semantic meaning can be a relation with the external world or with one's culture and, so long as the relation produces some change in the causal power of ...
In the 1980s, however, Jerry Fodor revived the idea of the modularity of mind, although without the notion of precise physical localizability. Drawing from Noam Chomsky's idea of the language acquisition device and other work in linguistics as well as from the philosophy of mind and the implications of optical illusions, he became a major proponent of the idea with the 1983 publication of ...
Fodor, Jerry (2000). The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology. Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press. ISBN 9780262062121. OCLC 43109956. Fodor, Jerry (2010). LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780199548774. OCLC 470698989. Harnad, Stevan (1994 ...
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The language of thought hypothesis (LOTH), [1] sometimes known as thought ordered mental expression (TOME), [2] is a view in linguistics, philosophy of mind and cognitive science, forwarded by American philosopher Jerry Fodor. It describes the nature of thought as possessing "language-like" or compositional structure (sometimes known as ...
Fodor suggested that there is also an "empirical issue" involving phenotypic "free-riders" (the evolutionary byproducts that Gould and Lewontin developed the 'spandrel' metaphor for). Fodor suggests that "serious alternatives to adaptationism have begun to emerge", and offers evolutionary developmental theory ('evo-devo') as one such alternative.
Katz, J. J. & Fodor, J. A. (1963). The structure of a semantic theory. Language, 39(2), Apr–Jun, 170–210. The Philosophy of Language (1966) The Underlying Reality of Language and Its Philosophical Import (1971) Language and other Abstract Objects (1981) The Metaphysics of Meaning (1990) Realistic Rationalism (2000)