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The principal–agent problem typically arises where the two parties have different interests and asymmetric information (the agent having more information), such that the principal cannot directly ensure that the agent is always acting in the principal's best interest, particularly when activities that are useful to the principal are costly to ...
The Bellman equation was first applied to engineering control theory and to other topics in applied mathematics, and subsequently became an important tool in economic theory; though the basic concepts of dynamic programming are prefigured in John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior and Abraham Wald's ...
The multiple principal problem, also known as the common agency problem, the multiple accountabilities problem, or the problem of serving two masters, is an extension of the principal-agent problem that explains problems that can occur when one person or entity acts on behalf of multiple other persons or entities. [1]
In microeconomics and contract theory, the first-order approach is a simplifying assumption used to solve models with a principal-agent problem. [1] It suggests that, instead of following the usual assumption that the agent will take an action that is utility-maximizing, the modeller use a weaker constraint, and looks only for actions which satisfy the first-order conditions of the agent's ...
The relationship between a company's shareholder and the board of directors is generally considered to be a classic example of a principal–agent problem.The problem arises because there is a division between the ownership and control of the company, [10] as a result of the residual loss.
The alignment problem has many parallels with the principal-agent problem in organizational economics. [149] In a principal-agent problem, a principal, e.g. a firm, hires an agent to perform some task. In the context of AI safety, a human would typically take the principal role and the AI would take the agent role.
Bayesian persuasion is a special case of a principal–agent problem: the principal is the sender and the agent is the receiver. It can also be seen as a communication protocol , comparable to signaling games ; [ 2 ] the sender must decide what signal to reveal to the receiver to maximize their expected utility .
The solution to a mean-field-type control problem can typically be expressed as a dual adjoint Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation coupled with Kolmogorov equation. Mean-field-type game theory is the multi-agent generalization of the single-agent mean-field-type control. [9]