Search results
Results From The WOW.Com Content Network
The OCSP responder uses the certificate serial number to look up the revocation status of Alice's certificate. The OCSP responder looks in a CA database that Carol maintains. In this scenario, Carol's CA database is the only trusted location where a compromise to Alice's certificate would be recorded.
The necessity of consulting a CRL (or other certificate status service) prior to accepting a certificate raises a potential denial-of-service attack against the PKI. If acceptance of a certificate fails in the absence of an available valid CRL, then no operations depending upon certificate acceptance can take place.
X.509 also defines certificate revocation lists, which are a means to distribute information about certificates that have been deemed invalid by a signing authority, as well as a certification path validation algorithm, which allows for certificates to be signed by intermediate CA certificates, which are, in turn, signed by other certificates ...
A series of incorrectly issued certificates from 2001 onwards [1] [2] damaged trust in publicly trusted certificate authorities, [3] and accelerated work on various security mechanisms, including Certificate Transparency to track misissuance, HTTP Public Key Pinning and DANE to block misissued certificates on the client side, and CAA to block misissuance on the certificate authority side.
Certificate revocation is "an important tool" for dealing with attacks and accidental compromises. RFC 9325 places a normative requirement on TLS implementations to have some means of distrusting certificates. [9]
The Server-based Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP) is an Internet protocol for determining the path between an X.509 digital certificate and a trusted root (Delegated Path Discovery) and the validation of that path (Delegated Path Validation) according to a particular validation policy.
The certificate is also a confirmation or validation by the CA that the public key contained in the certificate belongs to the person, organization, server or other entity noted in the certificate. A CA's obligation in such schemes is to verify an applicant's credentials, so that users and relying parties can trust the information in the issued ...
It allows the presenter of a certificate to bear the resource cost involved in providing Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) responses by appending ("stapling") a time-stamped OCSP response signed by the CA (certificate authority) to the initial TLS handshake, eliminating the need for clients to contact the CA, with the aim of improving ...